Priority to DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) or Internal Peace ?

Introduction

The Secretary General’s Supplement to an Agenda for Peace of 25 January 1995 (Agenda for Peace 1995) eloquently and succinctly recognizes the importance and legitimacy of efforts aimed at peace consolidation after conflicts : “The validity of the concept of post-conflict peace-building has received wide recognition. The measures it can use - and they are many - can also support preventive diplomacy. Demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development can be as valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after conflict has occurred. ” [1] The document highlights the distinction between UN peacekeeping missions involving a military interposition force following the cessation of hostilities (and often subsequent to a cease-fire or peace agreement between the belligerents), and peace consolidation efforts in post-conflict societies. As the document notes, peace consolidation efforts underscore the changes that have taken place within the UN and the international community since the end of the Cold War, [2] and the heightened expectations of the latter toward the former with regards to intervention missions.

Paragraphs 49 and 50 of Section C (under the heading “Post-conflict peace-building”) discusses two types of situations in which integrated missions aiming to consolidate peace in post-conflict societies [3] are called for. The first situation is described as follows : “A comprehensive settlement has been negotiated, with long-term political, economic and social provisions to address the root causes of the conflict, and verification of its implementation is entrusted to a multifunctional peace-keeping operation. [4] ” Paragraph 50 describes and qualifies this first scenario and its specific approach to peace consolidation with an interesting caveat : “The United Nations already has an entree. The parties have accepted its peacemaking and peace-keeping role. The peace-keeping operation will already be mandated to launch various peace-building activities, especially the all-important reintegration of former combatants into productive civilian activities. [5] ”

In this paper I will examine the case of Lebanon as an on-the-ground instantiation of the type of situation described in paragraphs 49-50 of the UN document, specifically with regard to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). I will argue that it is necessary to amend paragraph 50 slightly, particularly its caveat on the reintegration of soldiers in civilian life, which presupposes an initial disarming and demobilization effort on behalf of the mission.

The case of the UNIFIL

UNIFIL was first established in March 1978 on the basis of UNSC resolutions 425 and 426 following the first Israeli incursion in Lebanon. In the following years, the mission would undergo a number of changes in scope and personnel depending on the situation on the ground and subsequent UNSC resolutions. The current mandate of UNIFIL was established by UNSC resolution 1701 following the July 2006 war between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). UNSC resolution 1701 provided for an important expansion of the size of the mission (up to 13,000 military personnel). The resolution, agreed to by the Government of Lebanon of the time and the Government of Israel (and tacitly by the Hezbollah, a party to the conflict) also requested that (1) UNIFIL verify the complete withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanese territory, (2) monitor the cessation of hostilities, (3) extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the safe return of displaced persons, (4) monitor the Blue Line to ensure a safe and secure environment between the Line and the Litani River, and, critically, (5) assist the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in taking steps towards its deployment throughout the south (including the boundary between Israel and Lebanon) while (6) ensuring that this territory remain free of any armed personnel assets and weapons other than those of the LAF and UNIFIL. [6]

Though devastating to the population of the south of Lebanon, [7] the July 2006 war did not change the political landscape of Lebanon, particularly of the south, nor did it significantly weaken the military presence of Hezbollah. On the contrary, despite the important casualties and losses Hezbollah suffered, its capacity to resist the IDF incursion (and the losses it inflicted on the latter) strengthened its reputation and credibility among an important segment of the Lebanese population. Furthermore the effective humanitarian distribution system set up by groups and networks affiliated or controlled by Hezbollah in the reconstruction effort immediately after the end of hostilities contrasted positively with the relatively slower contribution of the UN-led relief effort, burdened as it was by the need for coordination among many actors and bureaucratic realities.

Faced with the realities on the ground — namely the glaring humanitarian emergency following the war on the one hand, and the power, influence and strengthened popular support of Hezbollah and its humanitarian efforts on the other —, UNIFIL quickly decided not to implement the obligations of all UNSC resolutions on Lebanon (425, 426, 520, 1559, 1655, 1680, 1697, 1701) which, among other things, required “the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon [...] so that there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state. [8] ” Nevertheless, UNIFIL actively worked on the other elements of its mandate. It oversaw the coordination of the UN-led relief effort and the provision of other humanitarian assistance, monitored the Blue Line to ensure a continued cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a safe and secure environment for all the communities present, and, most notably, succeeded in the effective deployment of the LAF south of the Litani river (including along the Israeli border) — a deployment with no precedent since the early nineteen-eighties. It is important to note that this remarkable achievement in the empowerment of Lebanese state institutions and the stabilization of the south could not have been carried out without the tacit approval of Hezbollah itself and all the necessary negotiations that went along with it.

This strongly suggests that the emphasis on reintegration (and presupposed disarmament) of armed groups in paragraph 50 of the Supplement for Peace needs to be adjusted to allow for a more flexible approach on the field especially with regard to the full/partial application of UNSC disarmament resolutions in processes of peace consolidation. The case of UNIFIL’s mandate in Lebanon and its relationship with Hezbollah highlights the need for a more nuanced approach. The ultimate goal may remain the disarmament of non-state armed groups, but what is required in the short- and medium-term is a pragmatic approach that accepts realities on the ground and the need for confidence-building measures over time.

Precedents to this approach

Indeed this approach has precedents in other post-conflict situations and peace consolidation processes, for example in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia). In Northern Ireland, the Good Friday Accord (10th of April 1998) called for the disarmament of all paramilitary groups, a disarmament that would be supervised by an independent commission. [9] The Irish Republican Army (IRA) refused to disarm at first. Instead of allowing the peace process to be torpedoed, a decision was taken to continue with negotiations on the implementation of other elements of the Accord with a view to maintaining the cease-fire and keeping the IRA engaged in the peace process, most notably through a variety of confidence-building measures. These measures’ objectives were “to contribute toward reducing or eliminating the causes for mistrust, fear, tensions, and hostilities, which are significant factors behind the international arms build-up. [10] ” The preliminary disarmament aim of the Accord was finally achieved a few years later on voluntary grounds. As the statement issued on the 28th of July 2005 by the IRA states : “All IRA units have been ordered to dump arms. [11] ”

The Bosnian case is analogous. The Dayton Peace Accords put an end to the terrible Bosnian conflict in November–December 1995. However, it is only in 2003 that the Army of Republika Srpska (one of the belligerents in the civil war) was integrated into a new national state army. Several years were required to create sufficient conditions to allow the international community to lead the transition to an integrated armed forces.

Conclusion

In conclusion, with Lebanon and other past and possible future cases in mind, I would argue in favour of a change in paragraph 50 whereby the emphasis on the reintegration of soldiers in civilian life (presupposing a disarmament and demobilization) is qualified by a particular requirement that this be an ultimate goal that takes into account the complex realities on the ground rather than an overriding priority which trumps other important goals. On the ground this can lead (as we have seen above) to the toleration of armed groups of non-state origin by the UN mission where this can in fact contribute to peace consolidation, provided that there is agreement on some preconditions. Generalizing from the case of Lebanon and UNIFIL, such toleration may be appropriate where the armed group already enjoys legitimacy among an important segment of the population, is integrated in the political scene and system of the country, and is actively taking part in a national dialogue process in cooperation with the UN mission.

References